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Introduction 
 
 
 British foreign policy during the interwar years has been the subject of 
extensive historical study both in Britain and abroad. A variety of schools of thought 
have emerged concerning the foreign policy strategy of the British government, 
typically referred to as appeasement. While the great depth of study directed to this 
specific area has contributed significantly to the understanding of cause, motive, and 
effect of British foreign policy in this period, it cannot be interpreted as offering a 
complete view of British foreign policy. It is my contention that propaganda produced 
and disseminated by Britain during the interwar period can also be seen to be a key 
factor in British foreign policy strategy. Not only can propaganda be considered as 
having contributed to the overall framework of British foreign policy, it can also offer 
a significant and unique viewing glass into British foreign policy aims, with both 
short term and long term foreign policy aims portrayed in various mediums of 
propaganda in numerous locations and unique situations. 
 
 There have been many studies either focusing on or incorporating propaganda 
in the interwar period, concerning the propaganda methods of not only Britain, but 
also those used by both Mussolini and the Fascist party in Italy and the Nazi party in 
Germany. Concerning the propaganda of Germany, Stanley Payne contends that Nazi 
propaganda, when coupled with art and culture, would be utilised to build the „new 
man‟ and that the focus of Nazi artistic policy stemmed from Hitler‟s personal belief 
that „art is the only truly enduring investment of human labour‟1.  The significance of 
                                                 
1 S G Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945, p.197 
 2 
the utilisation of art as propaganda adds a cultural aspect to the propaganda of Nazi 
Germany, as highlighted by David Welch, with acceptable art seen as transcending 
traditional class allegiances and presenting a visual representation of the national 
community or völksgemeinschaft
2
. 
Italian propaganda produced during the Mussolini dictatorship can also be 
seen to contain a significant cultural aspect, with the intention of remodelling Italy to 
create a „new‟ man to inhabit a new Rome, during a period of greatness to rival that 
reached at the height of the Roman Empire. For example, the extravagant architectural 
undertakings such as the building of aqueducts, and sports stadiums should not simply 
be seen as methods intended to strengthen the Italian economy while attempting to 
lessen the North/South divide, but also as a means of reshaping Italian culture, with a 
focus on modernisation, unification and the importance of physical strength. 
 
The study of British propaganda focuses largely upon that produced during 
both the First and Second World Wars. This can be forgiven due to the fact that while 
both Italy and Germany underwent major transformations with propaganda playing a 
pivotal role in helping the dictatorships both gain and then remain in power, the 
British experience of the interwar years was far less chaotic and the need for a fully 
functioning and highly funded propaganda was by no means a pressing issue. 
Historians including Messinger and Sanders study the role of propaganda in the First 
World War, focusing upon roles of key individuals involved in the creation of the first 
official propaganda bureau at Wellington House
3
, and the creation and development 
of propaganda designed to be used as a weapon
4
. Nicholas and Senton on the other 
hand focus upon British propaganda during the Second World War. Nicholas studies 
                                                 
2 Ed. A McElligott & T Kirk, Working Towards the Fuhrer, pp.97-98 
3 G S Messinger British Propaganda and the State in the First World War 
4 M L Sanders, British Propaganda During The First World War 1914-1918 
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the relationship between home front propaganda and the BBC, citing the useful nature 
of programmes giving advice on how to cope with rationing as well as contributions 
to public health campaigns, concluding that if the BBC had not broadcast „the civilian 
population‟s understanding of what it should do and what it might expect would have 
been seriously undermined, and while that it is impossible to gauge the effect of radio 
on British morale it provided information and entertainment with integrity despite
5
. 
Senton also studies the role of the BBC, and how it was used to speak to resistance 
groups within Europe and the role of general „psychological warfare‟ produced by the 
PWE
6
. 
 
Compared to the periods of the First and Second World Wars, the study of 
British interwar propaganda is negligible, with Philip Taylor providing the largest and 
most in depth study dedicated to British propaganda between 1919 and 1939. Taylor 
traces the history of the British propaganda apparatus from its post-world war one 
decay through to the preparation of propaganda to be utilised during wartime, 
focusing upon key individuals and their roles within the formulation of British 
propaganda while also attempting to explain the reasons behind the various 
organisations created to project Britain overseas
7
. With regard to cultural propaganda, 
Taylor defines this as „the promotion and dissemination of national aims and 
achievements in a general rather than specifically economic or political form, 
although it is ultimately designed to promote economic and political interests‟8. 
However Taylor‟s study of the British Council for Relations with Other Countries*, 
the main apparatus for the creation and dissemination of cultural propaganda, is broad 
                                                 
5 S Nicholas, The Echo of War: Home Front Propaganda and the Wartime BBC,1939-45, pp.271-274 
6 M Senton, Radio London and Resistance in Occupied Europe 
7 P M Taylor, The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939, p.vii 
8 Ibid. pp.125-126 
* Henceforth referred to as the British Council  
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and relatively chronologic. While highlighting several key contributing factors 
concerning its creation; the utilisation of „cultural diplomacy‟ by foreign governments 
most successfully those of France and Germany, and that Britain‟s chief concern was 
the consolidation and defence of existing interests and thus the „the atmosphere in 
which concepts of cultural or intellectual expansion overseas were conceived was 
generally absent‟9, Taylor focuses upon general areas of British Council activity such 
as improving propaganda directed towards South America and the British Council‟s 
close cooperation with the British Travel Association concerning the production and 
distribution of films portraying British life, culture, and achievements.  
 
Various in depth studies of specific areas of British propaganda during the 
interwar period do exist however. Both Callum MacDonald and Anthony 
Adamthwaite have provided studies of very specific areas of interwar propaganda. 
MacDonald offers a detailed analysis of the Italian propaganda emerging from Radio 
Bari and the various countermeasures employed by Britain between 1934 and 1937
10
. 
MacDonald highlights the importance of radio as a medium of propaganda in an area 
of high illiteracy such as the Middle East, and estimates that 60% of radio license 
holders were regular listeners to the Bari broadcasts. MacDonald concludes that the 
hostile nature of the Bari broadcasts led to Britain changing policy in the creation of 
the BBC‟s Arabic broadcasts, and restricted the influence of Radio Bari to Palestine, 
an area in which Britain had long accepted the inevitability of challenges to their 
influence
11
. 
                                                 
9 P M Taylor, The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939, 
pp.126-127 
10 C A MacDonald, Radio Bari: Italian Wireless Propaganda in the Middle East and British 
Countermeasures 1934-38 
11 Ibid., pp.201-204 
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Adamthwaite differs in both subject matter and approach that MacDonald, 
focusing not upon methods of propaganda in development and practice, but the 
relationship between the British government and various forms of media, specifically 
newspaper and Radio
12
. Adamthwaite highlights the problem of news management, 
particularly those created by often contrasting statements released by the Foreign 
Office and Downing Street, while also pointing out that despite there was great 
importance in representing the British position with regard to foreign policy, „official 
attempts to silence unwelcome opinion‟ were present in not only the mediums of 
newspaper and radio. Official intervention also appeared concerning production of 
literature that was deemed to inflammatory in nature during times of international 
crises, such as Wiskemann‟s history of Czechoslovakians and Germans, and the 
suppression of newsreels that voiced an opinion which contrasted the official policy 
of Whitehall
13
. 
 
Despite these smaller, more tightly focused studies the general lack of detailed 
and specific study of the activities of the British Council and the methods employed in 
the promotion of cultural propaganda leads to the focus of this paper. It is my 
intention to focus upon specific areas of cultural propaganda produced by the British 
Council, and by studying methods of British cultural propaganda in both the Near and 
Middle East, and Central Europe attempt to provide an in depth study of the practice 
of „cultural diplomacy‟. With regard to the study of cultural propaganda in the Near 
and Middle East, the main focus point will be that of Egypt. This was in part due to 
key logistical role of the Suez Canal which greatly simplified movements to the rest 
of the British Empire in the East such as India, Singapore, New Zealand and 
                                                 
12 A Adamthwaite, The British Government and the Media, 1937-1938 
13 Ibid., pp.287-290 
 6 
Australia, Secondly, Egypt was not technically a colony, and although Britain had 
enough power to impose occupation, it was far easier to have a degree of pro-British 
sentiment amongst key figures in the country. Finally, Egypt was also the site of 
propaganda based warfare between Italy and Britain, the extent of which is apparent 
when viewing the importance placed upon the cessation of propaganda during the 
negotiations leading to the eventual „Gentleman‟s Agreement‟ between the two 
nations. Concerning cultural propaganda in Europe, British activities in Italy will 
form the subject of a case study, due to the importance of Anglo-Italian relations to 
British foreign policy during the 1930s. A study of British propaganda in this period 
will allow not only for the methods adopted to be discussed, but also will enable one 
to judge the effects of the increasing tension in Anglo-Italian relations upon cultural 
propaganda, and indeed to some extent if any cultural propaganda succeeded in 
alleviating these tensions. The scope of „cultural propaganda‟ in this paper includes 
not only the use of newsreel, cinema and wireless broadcasting, but focuses heavily 
upon the role of education. The significance of the role of education as a means of 
improving cultural relations was recognised by many British officials, and it is my 
contention that cultural propaganda was not intended to solely influence the parent 
generation of the 1930s, rather the use of education would enable a positive opinion 
of Britain to permeate the youth for generations to come. 
The definition used to determine what can be classified as cultural propaganda 
will be similar to that used by Taylor, however rather than simply defining cultural 
propaganda as the promotion of national aims and achievements with an ultimately 
political goal in general terms, I would suggest that the definition should encompass 
the ultimate aim of influencing the normal behaviour or thought of a foreign culture. 
Thus cultural propaganda, in this paper, will be defined as „the promotion of national 
 7 
aims and achievements in a general form, intending to influence the normal social 
conventions of a foreign culture with the ultimate aim of promoting economic and 
political interests‟. Although the addition may appear minor, it is significant in 
allowing not just displays of British achievement in the cultural sphere to fall into the 
category of cultural propaganda, but also allows various programmes of education and 
private networks of relations to be categorised in such way. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
Cultural Propaganda and Education in the Near and Middle East 
 
 
 The British Council played a significant role in organising and disseminating 
cultural propaganda in the traditional sense as defined by Taylor. However the 
organisation was also heavily involved with incorporating educational institutes into 
the machinery of British cultural propaganda, as well as the various forms of 
„traditional‟ cultural propaganda which showcased British achievements, aims, and 
values. Formed in 1934, the roots of the British Council‟s interest in utilising 
education as a means of cultural propaganda in the Middle East can be seen as 
developing as early as March 1935, triggered by a report on British cultural 
propaganda in Egypt. The report consists of extracts of a despatch dated November 
1933 from Sir Percy Loraine, High Commissioner of Egypt, to Sir John Simon in 
which concerns were raised on the questions of both maintaining and developing 
English Education and culture, which was distributed to members of the British 
Council in the newly created Sub-Committee on Education in the Near East to aid the 
task of improving British educational influence in Egypt. Loraine felt that if British 
political and commercial interests were not to be irredeemably damaged the entire 
issue of cultural propaganda must be re-examined by the government
14
.  Loraine 
stated that British „cultural effort‟ was private and sporadic, poorly financed and 
staffed, and lacking in organisation and effectiveness when compared to efforts made 
by Latin Governments which dominated the field. Loraine further suggested that this 
gulf in cultural influence stemmed from the failure of Britain to create a strong 
cultural position for herself between 1882 and 1922, and that following the 
                                                 
14 PRO, BW 29/3,British Report on Cultural Propaganda in Egypt, p.1 
 9 
Declaration of Egyptian Independence it was found the France was predominant in 
the cultural field. Loraine quoted the pamphlet The Conflict of French and English 
Educational Philosophies in Egypt, composed by the American Professor Russell 
Galt, which offered a neutral opinion which supported Loraine‟s claims concerning 
British cultural influence stating – 
„In Egypt, England had an army – France an idea. England had educational 
control – France a clear educational philosophy. Because the French did have 
such an organised philosophy and the English did not, the French pen has 
proved mightier than the English sword.‟ 
 
Loraine concluded this negative assessment of British cultural influence by 
highlighting the increase in expenditure on cultural propaganda by the French 
government, stating that between 1928 and 1931 the amount had doubled, while the 
grant at the French School of Archaeology in Cairo had increased six fold. The reality 
of the lack of British influence concerning education is confirmed by the fact that in 
1930-31, for every Egyptian attending a British school, 9 received a French education, 
and that the number of Egyptians at British Schools diminished 10%, while those 
attending French schools increased by 10%, and those attending Italian schools in 
Egypt increased by 20% during the same period
15
. 
 Loraine outlined an 11 point plan to improve educational and cultural 
influence in the Near and Middle East, including the development of the Boy Scout 
movement, the formation of a girls school at Cairo and the encouragement of English 
Catholic missions to embark upon educational work in the area, and the foundation of 
a British University of the Near East to compete with the French University at Beirut. 
Other than the creation of a girl‟s school, Loraine‟s suggestions do not feature in the 
British Council‟s July report concerning development of British education and culture 
in Egypt. However, Loraine‟s despatch can be considered as the first serious attempt 
                                                 
15 PRO, BW 29/3,British Report on Cultural Propaganda in Egypt, p.2 
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to assert British cultural influence in the area. Further encouragement for British 
cultural aspirations appeared when an article in the Cairo based newspaper Balagh, 
translated in the Egyptian Gazette, approaching the subject of teaching English in 
Egypt. Despite the anti-British nature of Balagh, the article suggests that while 
Egyptians may be politically bound to say they hate everything British significant 
numbers wish to learn the English language and have their children brought up with 
British ideas
16
. While the report focuses upon educational aspects, including the 
provision of lectures on English art and literature and ensuring the availability of 
these successful talks, the report also notes the importance of developing cultural ties 
through other mediums. The report states that residents of the Near East have excelled 
in the performance of sports and games introduced by Britain, and suggests that were 
British regiments in Cairo seen to be superior at such games it would also suggest 
superiority in other areas, and British prestige would be enhanced by displays of 
sporting success on a local scale
17
. 
 
 Throughout the remainder of 1935 and early 1936, the development of cultural 
propaganda in the Near and Middle East was ponderous with much debate concerning 
the ideal strategy to adopt. At the second meeting of the Sub-Committee for 
Education in the Near East it was decided that the education of children of English 
birth should be the priority of educational policy in Egypt, however the foundation of 
a British Institute at Cairo was considered to be a high priority aim
18
, but due to 
mainly financial based issues the project did not become a reality
19
. The lack of 
                                                 
16 PRO, BW 29/3, Egypt’s Second Language, in the Egyptian Gazette, July 10th 1935 
17 PRO, BW 29/3, Suggestions for Development of British Education, Culture, etc. in Egypt, pp.2-7, 
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19 PRO, CO 732/82/9, Proposals for Expenditure of the British Council in the Near East for the 
Financial Year 1937-38, p.19 
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investment in cultural propaganda in the Near and Middle East was not unique 
however, and is highlighted by a 1937 memorandum providing estimates of 
expenditure of the „Great Powers‟ directed towards propaganda. The memorandum 
focuses largely upon expenditure specifically in the field of cultural propaganda 
between 1934 and late 1936. The report states that in 1934, the American budget for 
cultural propaganda was £140,355,253 of which £1,844,065 was solely directed 
towards educational programmes outside America including scholarships for foreign 
students. Figures relating to Italian expenditure in the field of „Propaganda and 
Prestige‟ amount to £1,139,154, however Italian cultural 
institutes were common across Europe and South America, and 3% of Italian 
propaganda expenditure focused upon language and culture, with the agencies of the 
Dante Alighieri Society and Instituto del Libro being fully utilised as propaganda 
organisations
20
.  
 The expenditure granted to the British Council for cultural propaganda in 
Egypt did increase due to the desire to fortify and extend their work in Egypt against 
the „increasing force of Italian and French Propaganda‟21, however in early 1938 
various schemes were proposed including estimated costs but were ultimately 
rejected. These included the creation of a „new‟ English school at Victoria College 
with running costs of £10,000, and a proposal for an English school to be created 
under Egyptian control at the cost of £250,000. It would not be until post 1938 that 
the budget of the British Council would increase to be competitive with rival nation‟s 
cultural propaganda expenditure in the Middle East. A number of new grants for 
Egypt were allocated following Lord Lloyd‟s visit in 1939, including a number of 
non-recurrent grants for the Evening Institute lectures of £2,100, the purchase of the 
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 12 
new site for the British school at Suez at £2,060, and a further £1,500 granted for the 
purchase of new land to expand the English Mission College
22
. 
Despite the economic setbacks regarding the increase of educational and 
cultural influence in Egypt, the matter of education was still being taken seriously 
with it being recognised that „one of the most important channels yet remaining by 
which the flow of British ideas into Egyptian minds can be maintained would seem to 
be the British personnel employed by the Ministry of Education‟. A report on 
education in Egypt produced in November 1937, forwarded to Lord Lloyd, highlights 
the desire for the very best British teachers and lecturers to be used in Egypt, and the 
need to address the fact that taking a seat at a university in Egypt leads to reduced 
prestige for academics, and that the limited range of salaries available for overseas 
educational staff should be improved
23
 in order to ensure a higher standard of 
teaching and a greater success of cultural influence. This report shows not only the 
commitment and comparative successes of early British attempts and increasing 
educational and cultural influence when viewed against the dominance of French 
institutes in the early 1930s, but also serves to highlight the difficulties of maintaining 
an effective education system with high quality teaching whilst also conveying British 
values to the Egyptian youth. A letter from Colonel Bridge to White describes the 
educational system as encountered with Lord Lloyd on a tour of educational facilities 
including the British Boys School, St Andrews College and Victoria College
24
. 
Despite the generally positive tone concerning developments including the immanent 
completion of a new hall at the British Boys School and the development of evening 
classes with the intention of providing the Cambridge Certificate of Proficiency in 
English, annexe A of the letter highlights educational problems in Egypt. The annex 
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highlights the educational load on British run schools regarding English pupils and 
that there is also an educational demand from many sections of the population who 
are not British for English education
25
. Despite the inability of British schools to 
provide education for all non-British youth in Egypt, most families felt it desirable for 
their children to learn English as it was seen as a valuable qualification for gaining 
employment, with more intelligent students also expressing their desires to take the 
London Matriculation class, and that when compared to these qualifications there was 
a growing consciousness developing that similar or equivalent Egyptian qualifications 
were valueless in comparison. Bridge highlights this decline in the public‟s opinion of 
the value of Egyptian qualifications as a positive for British educational expansion, 
with a corresponding opportunity opening for the increase of English university 
teaching in Egypt
26
. However, despite the popularity of British run courses, it was the 
priority of SCBENA to focus upon the education of British children abroad, and as 
such many Egyptians were refused entry to the institutes. 
This provides a mixed assessment of British Education in Egypt, showing that 
while the courses offered at British institutes were high in popularity with both British 
and Egyptian students alike, demand for these popular courses could not be met, and 
highlights the fact that despite the progress made since the late 1920s and early 1930s 
where France was dominant in the educational sphere within Egypt, the apparatus of 
British education in Egypt was far from complete and able to meet demand. This 
ultimately reflects the inability of Britain to achieve the goal of implanting British 
ideals and cultural values in the Egyptian youth via the medium of official educational 
institutes. 
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26 PRO, BW 29/4, Letter From Col. Bridge to White, March 3rd 1938, Annexe A, p2 
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During early 1939, the British Council began to tackle the issue of the 
education of Maltese and Cypriot children in the Middle East. Maltese and Cypriot 
pupils at this time either attended Greek run schools, or simply did not have access to 
education in the area, with figures showing that of 700 Maltese under the age of 15 
only 196 received education at a handful of British schools, while of 661 Cypriots of 
the same age, only 22 received British education in Egypt
27
. To combat this, a 
programme of increased subsidisation of Maltese pupils began at St. George‟s in 
Shoubra and St. Austin‟s at Heliopolis, as well as the provision of a free school at 
Bab-el-Karasta in Alexandria. This shows a marked effort to increase British 
educational influence in Egypt, and despite the outbreak of war on September 1
st
 1939 
the Near and Middle East remained a priority area for the spread and growth of 
cultural influence. This point is highlighted, particularly the educational aspect of 
British policy, by the opposition by members of the British Council to the proposed 
take over of Victoria College by the British Naval Authorities. In a memorandum 
drafted by C A F Dundas, Victoria College is described as holding a unique position 
in that it is the only British public school in the Near East with no distinction of race 
or religion, and as having built up an excellent reputation from Iraq to the Sudan in its 
thirty years of existence, with leading men from nearly every county in the Near East 
whose „sons are past or present members of the school, reflective of the high level of 
influence the college held in the areas during the period
28
. Dundas states that were 
Victoria College forced to continue work at a temporary location, the last thirty years 
of development would be wasted and connections with neighbouring countries would 
be broken, while speculating that unless there was no other alternative the 
abandonment of Victoria College and other educational institutions would „only have 
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in the long run a disastrous effect upon the position of Great Britain both during the 
war and in the following years‟. However, Dundas also recognised that the Victoria 
College situation was fait accompli, but still strongly defended the importance of the 
education system in Egypt and the importance of its role in building a new generation 
for the following peace. 
The programme of investing in education as a means of cultural propaganda 
designed to improve cultural relations by the British Council can be described as 
being largely successful. During the late 1920s and early 1930s it was clear that 
British education in the Middle East, in particular Egypt, trailed significantly behind 
the programmes of Italy and France. However, the continued development of an 
education network, both for pupils and adults alike helped address the situation and 
create a situation in which Britain could compete against the highly organised and 
effective education philosophies adopted by the French institutes in the region. The 
success of the British programme to educate not only children of British descent but 
also those of other nationalities is highlighted in a report on English schools in Cairo 
produced in December 1937. The report shows the returns of British and foreign 
teachers and pupils at thirteen British run schools in the years 1936 and 1937, and 
illustrates the increase in foreign pupils, and also that of British trained teachers. The 
total number of pupils in these school rose from 2,086 in 1936 to 2,336 in 1937, with 
the total number of teachers increasing from 163 to 171 during the same period, while 
the total of foreign pupils receiving British education rose from 1227 to 1384 and the 
total of foreign teachers at British schools increasing from 54 to 70
29
. An earlier 
report dated July 1935 concerning the development of cultural propaganda via the use 
of education states that the English Mission College at Koubbeh had achieved the 
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target of 400 pupils, mostly of foreign nationality
30
. When compared to the figures of 
pupils attending the college stated in the report of December 1937, the total of pupils 
attending the English Mission College had increased by 20%, which suggests that 
there was a high demand for a British based education, while the total number of 
pupils at British schools in Cairo increased by slightly over 10% between 1936 and 
1937, which again suggests a continued demand for British education. This also 
suggests that the methods of the British Council had indeed been successful in 
transforming the prospects of British education, particularly in Egypt, and the 
numbers of young Egyptians receiving British education and values had increased 
dramatically. This points towards the conclusion that British educational schemes in 
the Middle East can be described as a successful method of cultural propaganda, with 
a large target audience, particularly amongst the Egyptian youth, serving not only as a 
means of instilling British values amongst the youth but also in improving the prestige 
of Britain, a point highlighted by the desire to obtain British qualifications rather than 
the local equivalents. 
 
 Despite the mixed success of British educational programmes in Egypt, there 
were numerous smaller, more exclusive institutes formed with the intention of 
improving cultural relations between Britain and Egypt, the largest of which was the 
Anglo-Egyptian Union
31
, created in 1936 following the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. A 
report focusing on the AEU by a special sub-committee created to consider the 
extension of cultural activities sought to develop ways in which the AEU could 
increase activity building upon methods that were deemed feasible and implemented 
successfully during its first year of its existence. The methods used by the AEU to 
                                                 
30 PRO, BW 29/3, Suggestions for the Possible Development of British Education, Culture etc. in 
Egypt, July 4th 1935, pp.1-2 
31 Referred to henceforth as AEU 
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spread British culture consisted mainly of the organisation of lectures delivered to 
members and their guests, taking place both fortnightly and weekly when available 
and demand necessitated the extra lectures. The recommendations of the report were 
divided into two sections; direct educational work, and more „definitively cultural‟ 
work
32
, both of which were considered at great length by the sub-committee. Of the 
recommendations discussed in the report, those relating directly to education were 
deemed to be unnecessary, and outside the sphere of the AEU. However, the 
committee did agree to assist the AEU with the broader cultural activities 
recommended in the report, and agreed that a cultural director should be appointed to 
aid the AEU effectively undertake work of a cultural nature. Accompanying the 
recommendations is a list of AEU arranged lectures taking place both at the Union 
itself and the lecture hall of the Royal Geographical Society. The programme of 
lectures ran from November 1937 to April 1938, covering such topics as Egyptian 
Drama and Film, the place of Parliament in British history, the idea of 
Commonwealth in the British Empire, and English literature on the Near East. The 
lectures took place on the evening, and while the addresses themselves ranged from 
30 to 60 minutes, guests arrived early and remained after the lecture itself to socialise. 
Despite the continuing attendances of members and guests, the success of the AEU in 
promoting British cultural values was limited, as membership of the group was 
restricted largely to intellectuals, which lead Colonel Bridge to conclude that the 
group was not successful in the field of education due to this limited appeal
33
. 
 The outbreak of war in Europe can be seen as a crucial point in changing 
British propaganda policy as a whole; however the work of the British Council in 
Egypt remained relatively unaffected by events in Europe. A reorganisation of staff 
                                                 
32 PRO, BW 29/4, Extract of Minutes from 24th Meeting of the Ambassador’s Advisory Committee on 
Education, January 14th 1938 
33 PRO, BW 29/4, Letter From Col. Bridge to White, March 13th 1938, Annexe A, p.4 
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and Offices of the Evening Institute was drafted, and it was arranged that the institute 
would only disseminate „news and views as is consistent with the British Council‟s 
policy of refraining from any form of political propaganda or interference‟34. The 
British Council‟s work to improve cultural influence in Egypt was also more widely 
unaffected by the war in Europe, and the scheme of creating a teacher training college 
in Cairo was put into place in November 1939, with courses due to start in December, 
three years after it was originally suggested. This shows the importance of education 
as a means of improving cultural relations to the British Council, and the outbreak of 
war can be seen as a catalyst for improving the quality of teaching staff at British 
schools in Egypt, which had been an unrealised aim until this point. 
 
 Despite the large amount of effort on the part of the British Council 
developing a better organised and more effective British based education within the 
Middle East, particularly within Egypt, this was not the only significant approach to 
cultural propaganda adopted by Britain in the region. A more overt form of cultural 
propaganda adopted by Britain directed at influencing the Middle and Near east can 
appeared in the form of BBC broadcasts in Arabic. The nature of the BBC Arabic 
broadcast service differed from the work of the British Council in the region in one 
major respect; that it was not an improvement on an existing set of apparatus as the 
British Council attempted concerning education, but rather a direct response to the 
propaganda emanating from a foreign power, in this case Italy. 
 The possibility of the BBC broadcasting programmes in foreign language was 
raised as early as June 1936, in a memorandum entitled „The Possible Use of 
Languages Other Than English in the Empire Broadcasting Service‟. It was argued 
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that the creation of a foreign language service would have a positive effect on the 
projection of Britain and its values, stating that such a programme should be 
encouraged as British prestige and influence in world affairs would be increased 
abroad
35
. However, foreign language broadcasting did not become a reality until 
1938, after 3 years of overtly anti-British propaganda had emerged from the Italian 
Radio Bari. The broadcasts of Radio Bari were aimed at audiences in the Italian 
colony of Libya as well as Morocco, Palestine, Egypt, and the Red Sea region and did 
not begin as being hostile towards Britain. The station broadcast Eastern news and 
music with the intention of acting as cultural propaganda designed to increase Italian 
influence in the Middle East by praising Italy and the Fascist system
36
. Rome stated 
that the service was intended to „strengthen ties between Italy and the Arab peoples‟, 
with MacDonald stating two clear aims for the original purpose of Bari. Firstly, Italy 
wished to restore its prestige in the Arab world which had been damaged by the 
Senussi massacres during the re-conquest of Cyrenaica. The second was to register 
Italian interest in the area, as Italy felt she had been unfairly excluded from by Britain 
and France. MacDonald also highlights the point that radio was the ideal medium for 
propaganda in the region where many were illiterate with 10,000 individuals being 
license holders in Palestine alone by 1935, a figure which continued to rise with Italy 
producing cheap radio sets for Arab customers
37
. However following the Abyssinian 
crisis of September 1935 Radio Bari „abandoned cultural propaganda for an outright 
attack on British policy‟38. A Foreign Office report dated September 24th 1936 stated 
that Italian efforts targeted mainly Moslems within Palestine and Egypt as these areas 
                                                 
35 PRO, CO 323/1390/14, Memorandum on the Possible Use of Languages Other than English in The 
Empire Broadcasting Service 
36 C A MacDonald, Radio Bari: Italian Wireless Propaganda in the Middle East and British 
Countermeasures 1934-1938, Middle Eastern Studies, vol.13, no.2, p.195 
37 Ibid. pp.195-196 
38 Ibid. p.196 
 20 
housed nationalist groups who were strongly opposed to British rule. The report also 
notes that the Bari broadcasts had supported the both the September and December 
uprisings of 1935 in Egypt, and harboured the intention of inciting rebellion against 
British rule by claiming British support for a Jewish war against Arabs, citing poor 
treatment of Moslems under British rule as its precedent
39
. 
 Despite the immediate threat to British interests caused by the Bari broadcasts, 
progress was slow in developing a service that would counter the high output of anti-
British propaganda. This was partly due to the reluctance of the BBC, priding itself as 
being an independent company not under government control, as it was feared that in 
addressing part of its programming to foreign countries it would be seen to openly 
participate in propaganda and have a negative impact upon the organisations 
credibility
40
. With these concerns in mind a compromise was eventually reached in 
1938, with Sir John Reith acting as the only direct contact between the BBC and the 
Foreign Office, thus ensuring the independence of the BBC from Foreign Office. The 
BBC Arabic broadcasts began transmitting on January 3
rd
 1938 and can be judged as 
an almost immediate success with numerous reports stating that Italy had began 
constructing wireless disturber stations on Sardinia, suggesting that Mussolini feared 
the possibility of hostile broadcasts directed towards areas on Italian influence in a 
similar fashion to those emanating from Radio Bari. 
  
Finally in the region, the use of film as a means of cultural propaganda was 
utilised in the classic sense as defined by Taylor; a means of showcasing British 
achievements and aims. A report on film work produced by the Travel and Industrial 
Development Committee highlights three key areas for film distribution; British 
                                                 
39 PRO, FO 371/20027, Report on Palestine, September 24th 1936 
40 P M Taylor, The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939, 
pp.193-194 
 21 
Newsreels abroad, the production and distribution of British documentary films 
abroad, and British fiction films. Regarding British Documentary films, the British 
Council agreed to expand upon the arrangements for the distribution of films in 
foreign theatres by distributing films for free, in areas such as the Near East with the 
British Council donating £400 and £1,200 in the financial years 1936/37 and 1937/38 
respectively for the necessary copies of these „free‟ films across 22 countries41. There 
was however a demarcation between the British Council and the Travel Association 
concerning the focus of the types of film to be distributed, with the Council seeking to 
utilise films of a cultural or education character, while the Travel Association sought 
to focus upon those containing a tourist or industrialist theme. 
 The minutes of the Joint Committee on Films meeting held in October 1937 
outline the plans for the distribution of suitable films in various world regions. 
Concerning the Middle and Near East, Primrose stated that he had guaranteed the 
distribution of six British films in Egypt, but faced difficulties finalising distribution 
in Palestine and Iraq which was delayed until May 1938. Despite this mixed success, 
the six films despatched to Egypt were aired in December 1937, and 2 reels of a 
prestige film of the Royal Navy was produced and distributed for Cinema release in 
early May 1938. Six films were also released in Iraq and ran for two weeks at cinemas 
in Basra and Baghdad; however reports stated that the films were of little interest to 
the local cinema audience as only a minority were able to understand them
42
. In 
Palestine, the same six films were considered „extremely suitable and likely to be 
popular not only with British policemen and their families, but with the Jewish and 
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European communities generally‟, and were set to be released one per month over six 
months, each showing for a period of 4 weeks
43
. 
 The continued distribution of British produced films throughout late 1937 and 
Early 1938 in the region would suggest that the use of film as a medium of cultural 
propaganda can be considered a success, due to the continued development and 
continued investment the Joint Committee on Films continued to receive from the 
British Council. The wide release of these films in cinemas across the Near and 
Middle East would also suggest that these films reached a large audience, with the 
release of films to schools within Egypt showing that the educational aspirations 
behind the British Council‟s use of film had again been achieved on a limited scale. 
However, it is difficult to judge the success of the films as a medium of cultural 
propaganda in particular whether films showcasing British achievements, for example 
the film Precision which dealt with the accuracy of British manufacturing processes
44
, 
would have a wide appeal to foreign audiences and in turn cast Britain in a more 
favourable light. Reports from Palestine stating the films would be deemed a success 
are contradicted by those received from Iraq suggesting such films garnered little 
interest from local audiences, which suggests that the reception of British Films in the 
region varied greatly upon local lines, making it impossible to judge the effectiveness 
of British film as a medium of cultural propaganda in the Near and Middle East 
during the interwar period. 
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British Cultural Propaganda in Europe 
 
 
 
The work of the British Council in Europe draws many parallels with that undertook 
in the Near and Middle East during the mid to late 1930s. The use of education as a 
means of increasing cultural influence played a large role in British cultural 
propaganda in both regions, with other media such as the use of film both 
documentary as well as newsreel playing a supporting role in showcasing British 
achievements as well as portraying British life and culture in a positive light. 
However, the role of education as a method of cultural propaganda in Europe differed 
from that in the Middle East, in particular Egypt, as British educational facilities had 
to compete against pre-existing national organisations where it none had been present 
in the Middle Eastern region. In place of the variety of pre, primary, and secondary 
schools establish in the Middle East catering for both children of British and foreign 
descent, the main focus of British education in Europe lay with various „British 
Institutions‟, thus so did the potential avenues for improving cultural influence within 
Europe. 
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Education and Cultural Propaganda within Italy 
 
 
 Perhaps the most renowned institute was located at Pallaza Antinori in 
Florence. The institute was founded in 1918 at the cessation of the First World War 
under the aegis of a Committee of English residents and Italian professors with the 
support of the British Ministry of propaganda
45
, following advice to the British 
government from those involved with „the struggle against enemy propaganda‟ to 
subsidise a centre for the serious study of English in what was considered the 
intellectual capital of Italy. The centre received government funding until 1921 
despite a recommendation by the Foreign Office appointed to enquire into British 
activities abroad. However, the prestige of the Institute, and in turn Britain, was not 
damaged as funding arrived from other sources; originally from Sir Walter Becker, a 
British shipping magnate, between 1921 and 1924 and an annual grant received from 
the Serena Foundation
46
. From 1925 onwards, the Institute survived on the final one 
million lire donation by Sir Becker and two grants from Sir Daniel Stevenson and 
Miss S R Courtauld, each amounting to £10,000. Despite these sources of private 
funding, the 1935 brochure suggests that the economic survival of the institute was 
becoming threatened due to the depreciation in value of Sterling, and the conversion 
operations in Britain and Italy which reduce interest on investments from 5% to 3.5%. 
Lord Rennell highlights the importance placed upon the French institutes located at 
London, Rome and Florence, and duly notes that the high level of investment reflects 
the important of education means of cultural influence, and further states that  
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„in an age of democracy the friendships of nations depends upon public 
opinion, and it should therefore be our constant endeavour to attach and 
inform that opinion, especially among the young‟47 
 
The view of Rennell concerning the important role of educational facilities in 
strengthening national ties as well as improving cultural relations echo the thoughts of 
many within the British Council related to the programme of educational development 
in the Middle East. The importance of the Institute was recognised by the British 
Council as early as December 1934, with a report stating that there can be no doubt as 
to the Institutes success citing the award of 26 Teachers‟ Diplomas in English to 
students, with thousands of Italians in turn being taught by ex-students in Government 
secondary schools across Italy
48
. Despite the noted success of the Institute, the report 
concludes by highlighting the need to increase British influence in Italian higher 
education, as at the close of 1934 there was only one Chair of English in all Italian 
Universities compared to seven French and Eight German Chairs. 
 In a memorandum on the history and present position of the Institute supplied 
to the British Council by Captain Harold E Goad, Director of the British Institute at 
Florence between 1922 and 1939, it is noted that the interest of the above mentioned 
donations, together with student fees, annual subscriptions from British Universities, 
and fees of British and Italian visitors in Florence who subscribe to gain usage of the 
library and reading rooms are the main source of funding, but also that donations of 
books were received from the Foreign Office, as well as up to date popular British 
newspapers. The memorandum concludes with an assessment of the value and future 
possibilities of the Institute
49
, stating that the success of its work is difficult to gauge, 
noting that while between 100-150 ex-students have entered Italian secondary schools 
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and have greatly improved the teaching of English, the language still falls behind the 
teaching of French and German within Italy, highlighted by the greater number of 
university chairs held by students of French and German. The memorandum also 
notes that the Institute was „heavily handicapped by need of the strictest economy‟, 
with increasing student fees and restrictions on printing being of „doubtful advantage 
to its work‟. The desiderata of the Institute were listed as the reduction of fees for 
students, the ability to grant scholarships to benefit poorer students, to invite students 
of Italian from British universities with the possibility of an exchange scheme, and to 
invite well known British lecturers to speak at the institute on a regular basis. The 
memorandum concludes that „if these aims are attained, it is confidently predicted that 
its work could be greatly extended‟50. 
 
Taylor also recognises the somewhat strange relationship between the treasury 
and the funding available for propaganda, stating that although there was an argument 
that qualitative rather than quantitative propaganda was more effective, it was still in 
essence a financially expedient argument. Taylor does highlight the rapid increase in 
funding available to the British Council, from £500 in 1935 to £330,000 by 1939
51
 
however it must also be noted that this budget was not solely for cultural propaganda, 
let alone the educational aspects of this work. Thus, the relatively low official funding 
available for quasi-official organisations such as the British Institute at Florence 
cannot be considered as an aberration, but simply as an unavoidable consequence of 
the nature of British propaganda when compared to the fully state organised and 
heavily funded apparatus of the totalitarian regimes. This relatively low level of 
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funding available to the Institute at Florence and other aspects of British propaganda 
work can be seen to stem from the historical reluctance of the treasury to invest in 
peacetime propaganda. Following the First World War, the Treasury proved reluctant 
to accept proposals for peacetime propaganda. While conceding propaganda activities 
could not be terminated immediately, it was expected that the Foreign Office would 
discontinue ant type of propaganda once it began failing to produce positive results
52
. 
Cultural propaganda was outlawed entirely and only work of a commercial nature 
rather than political should be performed during peacetime. On one hand, it can be 
argued that the Treasury distrusted the propaganda apparatus, in particular the 
Ministry of Information, due to its accountability to the Prime Minister rather than the 
Treasury or Parliament. Conversely, the reluctance to fund British propaganda can be 
considered to have developed from the political ideal that any propaganda, to a lesser 
extent economic or commercial propaganda, was considered „un-British‟. Thus, the 
Treasury was more likely to favour propaganda which would promote British trade 
and commercial interest rather than an „uncharacteristic form of self-glorification‟53. 
 
 Despite the inconsistent and often haphazard approach of the Treasury 
regarding the funding of propaganda, the continued success of the Institute as a 
cultural tool was again highlighted in correspondence between Goad and Col. Bridge, 
which focused upon the activities of the Institute regarding British music. Goad offers 
a brief description of a small concert performed by Italian musicians, set up by a 
student named Floris, who incorporated musicians from the Florentine Youth 
Orchestra, and the intentions of Floris to perform another concert focusing upon 
contemporary British music, which Goad notes was as unknown as the classic British 
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works. Goad further states that British printed music was a rare commodity and as 
such, many concerts featuring the work of composers of various nationalities 
performed little or no British music due to this. Goad also comments on the popularity 
of British books, citing the example of the Board of Trade‟s participation at the 
triennial International Book Fair held in Florence in 1928 with sales exceeding those 
of any other nation represented, and states that the inability of the Institute to fund 
such endeavours is common across all areas of cultural expansion, and requests „a few 
hundred pounds‟ to provide funding for similar events54 and improve the effectiveness 
of the Institute in expanding the projection of Britain. This letter again highlights both 
success and difficulties concerning British cultural expansion in Italy, as while it is 
suggest that there were numerous opportunities available for exploitation of cultural 
gains, lack of funding prevented any serious attempt to promote British cultural 
achievements in music or to distribute British literature or books with Britain as the 
subject as the DOT had in 1928. As stated in the first chapter, the funding available 
for propaganda purposes was limited during the early to mid 1930s, however Goad 
succeeded in acquiring a £200 grant in October 1935 the aid the Institutes 
involvement in expanding its cultural activities in Florence other than the teaching of 
English at a university standard
55
. 
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The Abyssinian Crisis and Cultural Propaganda in Italy 
  
 
The influence of the Institute within Italy was greatly affected by the 
deepening Abyssinian Crisis. Throughout 1935 Italy had sought to expand its 
influence in Africa by conquering Abyssinia, and despite the Franco-Italian 
agreement of January 1935 granting Italy parts of French Somaliland Italian 
aggression continued towards Ethiopia. Despite claims of Italian Military build up, 
the League of Nations was slow to react, and in late September Abyssinia mobilised 
its ineffective army in an attempt to halt hostilities quickly. The League of Nations 
deemed Italy as the aggressor, and began the process of imposing economic sanctions 
against Italy; leading to strained relations between Italy and countries within the 
League, including Britain. 
This had a marked effect upon British propaganda, as noted above concerning 
the Radio Bari situation in the Middle East, as well as serving to highlight the 
importance with which the leading powers now viewed propaganda in regard to 
international relations. The issue of propaganda had became a significant one with 
bearing upon international relations; the best example being the thorny issue of Italian 
propaganda and British countermeasures both in direct response to anti-British 
propaganda and representations of Italy becoming a significant factor in negotiating 
Anglo-Italian rapprochement between 1937 and 1938
56, with Britain stating „The 
cessation of propaganda was not a pre-condition of the opening of conversations, but 
                                                 
56 See PRO, PREM 1/276 
 30 
that it was necessary in order to create an atmosphere in which such conversations 
could be successful‟57. 
Reports sent from Goad concerning Italian public opinion towards the Institute 
at Florence, and in turn Britain and her policy towards Italy suggest that despite his 
best efforts to maintain good relations via private networks of friends, the Italian 
attitude was one of „aggrieved defiance‟ against the economic sanctions imposed by 
the League, with Britain bearing the brunt of hostility
58
. Goad also stated that the 
number of students for the academic year 1935-36 fell from 250 to 100, attributed to a 
distinct boycott of the English language and culture in all secondary schools meaning 
that there was no need for prospective teachers to learn English at the time. By March 
1936 every Anglo-Italian organisation had collapsed with the exception of the British 
Institute, and due to the lack of trade between Britain and Italy, the English language 
had lost all commercial value, placing the Institute in a precarious position. 
The negative effects of the Abyssinian crisis were apparent not only in relation 
to the British Institute, but with all British related activities viewed with hostility by 
the Italian public. In a letter from Goad to Dr J W Mackail, Goad states that all things 
British are despised, and that the British public had no idea of how strong the 
„revulsion of feeling‟ was within Italy. However, more disturbingly on a cultural 
level, Goad stated  
„the Germans are everywhere triumphant. They are not only ousting our trade 
products from Italian markets with long-term contracts….but they are re-
establishing their political and social position with the deliberate design of 
undoing our work
59.‟ 
 
This suggests that despite the success of the Institute through the 1920s and early 
1930s in providing a base for cultural propaganda in Italy, the Abyssinian crisis had 
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not only lowered British prestige but had also allowed the cultural propaganda of 
foreign countries, in particular Germany, to dominate and undermine British efforts to 
maintain friendly relations with Italy via strong cultural ties. The gains made by 
Germany in the cultural sphere were further highlighted by Goad in November 1936, 
summarising developments regarding German influence in education. Goad states that 
Germany was now taught at all Italian universities with full Professorial Chairs 
permanently established at Padua, Milan, Turin, Genoa, Florence, Bologna, Rome, 
Pisa, Naples and Palermo, with the creation of prizes for Italian students of German as 
well as catering for travelling students for Italy to Germany in exchange programmes 
between the Goethe Haus of Rome and the Petrarca House of Cologne. It was also 
noted that in Rome alone there were four Italo-German institutes including the 
German Academy for Artists and the German Archaeological Institution
60
, compared 
to the sole British asset, the British Institute. 
 The fortunes of the British cultural programme in Italy again changed in 
accordance with general relations between Britain and Italy, however despite the 
signing of the Mediterranean Pact there were many reservations with regard to 
rebuilding Anglo-Italian friendship
61. The Italian press was described as „satisfied‟ 
with the agreement, and that Italian public opinion was no longer anti-British, with an 
overwhelming feeling of sincere relief that the period of tension between the two 
nations over the Abyssinian Crisis had passed. In terms of rebuilding the friendship 
and once again increasing British cultural influence Goad proposed several measures 
to expand the activities of the Institute; increasing the number of summer schools in 
London and providing free tickets for top students, and expanding the current English 
bulletin to include a wider subject variety and articles by scholars based outside 
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Florence, as well as extending a branch of the Institute outside Florence. The recovery 
of the Institute following the completion of the Gentleman‟s Agreement is charted in 
the 1937 Annual Report of the Board of Governors. The total number of students 
attending the British Institute for the academic year 1936-37 was 203 excluding 
external students, compared to 156 for the 1935-36 year, while an extension of the 
Institute based in Milan received 20 regular students of which three out of four fifth 
year students won the Teacher‟s Diploma62. The increase in the number of students at 
the Institute compared to the previous academic year not only suggests a positive 
correlation between perceptions of Britain and international politics, but also shows 
that the continued work of the Institute had begun to regain ground lost to German 
cultural programmes in the 12 months following the Abyssinian crisis. 
 Following the success of the British Institute branch at Milan, it was agreed 
that a grant of £350 would be made available to continue the expansion to Urbino, 
which proved fruitful with the branch achieving attendance of 40 students 
participating in three courses on English Literature
63
. The academic year 1937-38 was 
also the first in which the Institute received a larger subsidy from the British Council, 
including the guarantee of a pension of £100 per year to staff at the Institute and the 
creation of scholarships offered to Italian students for the London Holiday Course. 
The Council also offered a further £600 per annum to provide for an additional 
Professor of English who would also act as Assistant Director of the Institute, with the 
appointment confirmed in December 1937 of Ronald Bottrall of Pembroke College. 
This increased investment from the British Council shows that the British government 
not only valued the long standing contribution by the Institute to fostering cultural 
relations between Britain and Italy, but also recognised that maintaining good 
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relations with Italy were of the utmost importance concerning the worsening 
European situation. This increased investment also indicated that cultural propaganda 
had became a significant part of international relations, and was now recognised as a 
key area of foreign policy crucial to achieving the aim of maintaining a European 
peace.  
 The fact that the success of Institute at Florence can be seen to vary greatly 
between 1935 and 1938 serves to highlight the vulnerability of cultural propaganda to 
changing international relations. It may seem an obvious statement that when the 
policy of the British government stood in opposition against that of Mussolini the 
popularity of Britain, and in turn its foreign institutes will suffer. Yet one of the 
purposes of cultural propaganda is to act as a cushion against the negative effects of 
such events, in attempting to maintain good relations and creating an arena other than 
that of the political where the British view can be aired with the opportunity to be 
understood. The presence of such cultural institutes also serves the purpose of 
allowing „Britishness‟ to be viewed as separate from government policy, and that the 
concept of „British‟ is not negative despite hostility towards British policy.  
  
The success of the British Institute at Florence was judged officially by the 
British Council on two criteria. The first was „its popular success with the local 
British Colony in attracting subscribers, and a few prominent foreigners, to popular 
lectures and to the use of the library of well known modern books‟. The second 
criteria for judging the success of a British Institute was „its success in creating a 
number of scholars capable of teaching out language in the schools of their own 
country and imbued with a knowledge and appreciation of the higher values of our 
 34 
thought and literature‟64. By using these criteria, it is possible to chart the 
development of the Institute from 1935, when the British Council became the 
controlling organisation for the production and promotion of British cultural 
propaganda. The figures of both the attendance of pupils studying English at this 
higher level and the number of subscribers to the Institute appear in the annual 
reports, along with a brief description of the activities undertaken over the previous 12 
months, and a summary of the summer course for Italian students held in London. 
The number of subscriptions for the academic period correlates with the 
number of students attending each academic year, with 250 students for the year 
1934-35, falling 103 students and subscribers for the academic year 1935-36
65
, rising 
to a number of 256 for the year 1936-37, with 300 for 1937-38, and finally 289 
students for the academic year 1938-39
66
. These figures show that the total number of 
students had rose progressively as the Institute expanded to provide branches of 
learning in Milan and Urbino. The anomalous figure in this respect is that of the 
academic session 1935-36. However this was not due to a failing on the part of the 
Institute, rather a reflection of increased international tension following the League of 
Nations economic sanctions placed upon Italy following the Abyssinian crisis, and 
due to the prominent role of Britain within the League, this manifested in a hostility 
towards Britain and its institutions representing her in Italy. 
With regard to the second official criteria of judging the success of the 
Institute, the number of Diploma‟s granted in the academic year 1938-39 was 22, with 
39 students granted the Certificati di Licenza, compared to the award of 4 Higher and 
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20 Teacher‟s Diploma‟s awarded in 1936-37, and 26 Diploma‟s granted in 193467. 
This suggests an average of 25 scholars capable of teaching both the English language 
and positive values of Britain at a higher standard emerging per year, and taking 
teaching positions within the existing Italian education system. Thus, using official 
markers to gauge the success of the Institute at Florence, the work conducted in the 
educational and cultural sphere can be deemed as a success, with high student 
attendance and subscription to the institute, as well as providing a consistent stream of 
highly educated scholars imbued with greater knowledge and appreciation of the 
higher values of British thought and Literature. This also serves to highlight the long 
term strategy of British education policy in relation to cultural propaganda, in that it 
was deemed essential to educate a generation of teachers with a good understanding 
of Britain who would in turn educate the primary and secondary schools imparting a 
similarly positive view of Britain and her culture.  
Aside from educational methods of cultural propaganda, private connections 
were also utilised. Harold Goad, in the midst of the Abyssinian crisis and the 
imposition of sanctions placed upon Italy by the League of Nations, attempted to not 
only improve the public opinion regarding the Institute at Florence, but also improve 
general opinion of Britain. Due to the hostile public opinion towards Britain following 
the sanction imposition, Goad attempted to use private connections with influential 
individuals to maintain good relations with Italians, and in turn help ensure the British 
Institute at Florence retained its good reputation. Goad states that his personal efforts 
to maintain friendly relations were „received with sympathy, and even with a certain 
kindly emphasis‟68. Goad placed a wreath at the memorial to Italian soldiers on 
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Armistice Day which was „sympathetically reported‟ in the Italian press, and also held 
a reception with over 100 guests held on the afternoon of the same day. Despite many 
Italians politely declining Goad‟s invitation apart from former students and institute 
staff, suggesting that many were unwilling to attend an Anglo-Italian gathering. Goad 
also stated that he continued to frequent Rotary Club meetings, including a planned 
visit to the Paris branch on November 27
th
 to meet a large gathering of British and 
Italian Rotarians and discuss the present situation. The efforts of Goad to utilise 
private relations to ease Anglo-Italian relations, in particular the attitude towards the 
British Institute, were little more successful than the attempts of the Anglo-German 
Fellowship. The Institute at Florence did once more see an increase in students from 
the academic year 1936/37 onwards, however this can be attributed more to the 
improvement in political relations between the two nations and the negotiations for 
Anglo-Italian rapprochement which ultimately led to British recognition of Italy‟s 
position in Abyssinia rather that the effect of maintaining friendly personal 
relationships with individual Italians. 
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Educational Investments in France 
 
 
Regarding central Europe, the British Council also held a vested interest in 
utilising education as a means of cultural propaganda. The British Institute of Paris, 
formed in 1894 by Edith Williams, began life as the Anglo-French Guild, before 
developing into the British Institute in 1926, which became affiliated to the University 
of Paris in 1928
69
. The Institute at Paris had a similar role to that based in Florence, 
mainly educating students to a high level of English offering teaching diplomas as a 
means to educate young French pupils in English as well as improving cultural 
understanding between the two nations. The Institute catered for both British and 
French students, with numbers increasing dramatically following its rebranding from 
the „Anglo-French Guild‟ to the British Institute of Paris. For the academic year 1929-
30, the institute catered for 164 French and 74 British students, with 20 and 23 hours 
of lectures respectively. This number had increased to 553 French and 222 British 
students for the academic year 1936-37, with a further increase in students for the 
following year, with 613 French and 256 British students at the school, amounting to 
54 hours of lecture time for French students, and 60 allocated to British students
70
. 
The methods of education implemented by the Institute at Paris were similar in 
nature to those used at Florence, such as the use of summer schools and exchange 
programmes, the maintenance of a fully stocked library of British literature, and the 
use of guest lecturers. The lectures at the Institute were of a similar nature to those 
presented at the Institute in Florence and those presented to the Anglo-Egyptian 
Union, for example guest lectures for the year 1934-1935 presented subjects such as 
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The Place of the Civil Service in Britain, English Women in Politics, and What 
National Government Means
71
. The success of these lectures held both at the British 
Institute and at the University of Paris attracted audiences of up to 800 people, and 
their success was recognised by the British Council who in turn funded a scheme 
whereby lecturers would proceed to other French Universities and provincial centres 
after delivering two to three lectures in Paris itself.  
Due to the relative proximity of the Institute of Paris to Britain when 
compared to the Institute of Florence, the organisation of summer courses and guest 
speakers was much more common, partly due to easier logistics and significantly 
cheaper travel costs. For example, in contrast to the single summer school held in 
London on behalf on the Institute at Florence, there were six courses available to 
French students, designed specifically to combine a stay in the United Kingdom with 
the study of a particular aspect of British culture. Four of the courses took place in 
London, three of which covered the subjects of English language and literature with 
the remaining course teaching practical dramatic production, with the final two 
courses taking place in Cardiff and St Albans, encompassing a commercial course in 
focusing upon English banking and commerce and educational and recreational 
gymnastics respectively
72
. However, despite the appointment of a director at the 
Institute, the ultimate control of policy lay with the executive committee in London, 
of which Lord Crewe was chairman. This allowed the focus upon higher education to 
take a more overtly political role, as the Institute also cooperated with the War office 
during 1939 by providing for British officers wishing to take the Interpreter‟s exam, 
with candidates taking the course in the Autumn months as well as spending time 
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serving with French military units
73
. Despite this obvious preparation for the outbreak 
of war, the report of the Director of the Institute of October 1939 focuses largely upon 
the successes of the Institute in teaching both French and English to British and 
French students respectively, and the number of former students working within the 
French education system as a means of quantifying the work of the Institute. The 
report states that using the French Census of 1938 showed that of amongst teachers of 
English in French Schools, more than 600 were former students of the Institute at 
Paris, and that highlighted the extent to which the Institute was able to influence the 
French education system as well as stating that Interpreter courses for both French 
and British Officers alike, and various „correspondence courses‟ highlighted that the 
Institute was „an instrument of the first importance in strengthening and extending 
cultural relations between England and France, not only in Paris, but also in the 
Provinces in a wide and varied way‟74. Despite the admitted focus upon higher 
education, the report notes that the Institute had increasingly developed its activities 
as a centre of cultural propaganda in France, and that these should be further 
increased by increasing the opportunities for social contacts between English and 
French people within the Institute, encouraging more popular British lecturers to visit 
France, and by increasing the amount of elementary English instruction already 
provided by the Institute. However, the report notes the negative effects of war upon 
the Institute, highlighting the difficulties in enrolling British students during war time 
and the economic impact a lack of students would create, estimating a potential loss 
of up to £3,031. The headquarters of the British Institute at Paris were moved to 
Reading University in October 1939, and continued its educational work, granting 
four scholarships to British Students, one of whom hailed from Australia, however the 
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main focus of the Institute during war time was in appealing to British students with 
an interest in France, and providing English lessons to French nationals within 
Britain, including members of the Free French Forces. 
The Institute continued its educational work throughout war time, and in 
abiding by the British Council charter attempted to concern itself with the spread of 
ideas about Britain to foreign nationals, with Honorary Secretary Townroe stating that 
as late as March 1941 the Institute was approached by Lord Cromer, Captain Bullock 
and Oliver Harvey concerning „a plan of action to disseminate information about the 
British point of view‟ concerning the war to French residents within Britain as well as 
the Free French Colonies
75
. 
The work of the British Institute at Paris can be seen as a highly successful 
endeavour due to the importance placed upon the employment of former students in 
the French education system. This illustrates an approach to cultural propaganda by 
Britain that not only sought to influence and educate those with intelligence but 
desired to influence the views and opinions of former students so that when 
embarking upon a career in education, a career which over 600 students did indeed 
pursue, future generations would be influenced by the Institute via its former students. 
 
As well as the British Institute in Paris, another key educational facility in the 
region was the Paris British School. The school was founded in 1832, was 
independently funded and free from control of the British Embassy in France, and 
provided a British education for the children of former British soldiers who married 
French wives following the cessation of the First World War. The aim of the school 
during the 1930s was to educate the British children who would be second generation 
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French nationals, in particularly the „lower class‟ of British residents in Paris who 
spoke only French at home and provided most of the pupils attending the school
76
. In 
December 1936 F B Stead compiled a report on the school stating that roughly half of 
the 60 pupils present, ranging from the ages of 6-17, had studied previously in French 
education, with five attending schools in England, one in Scotland, five more in other 
countries and fourteen having never attended school before. In terms of the success of 
pupils at the school, the report states that between nineteen students had taken the 
British chamber of Commerce exam, with only one failure between 1933 and1936, 
while in the subject of Shorthand, thirty-four of thirty-nine students successfully 
completed examinations during the same period
77
. Stead also asserts that there was a 
steady demand for a school of this type in the area, which further suggests that the 
school can be seen as a successful means of cultural propaganda, due to the high 
number of students able to secure clerical and civil service jobs both in France and 
Britain due to a combination of qualifications gained and bilingual abilities. The 
reports of Stead and Noble Hall served to nullify the schools‟ minor standing in 
comparison to the Institute at Paris, leading to the British Council providing a 
recurring grant of £1000 in order to maintain operations
78
 following a memorandum 
based on these reports produced by Henry Pelham, as well an additional grant of £408 
in February 1940
79
. The increased funding of the school again highlights the 
importance of education as a means of cultural propaganda, as large numbers of 
students attained jobs in the civil service positions of both France and Britain, many 
of whom had received an education that also offered positive views on Anglo-French 
                                                 
76 PRO, BW 31/15, M Noble Hall: Notes on Paris British School, December 14th 1938 
77 PRO, BW 31/15, Report by F B Stead on Visit to Paris British School, December 1936 
78 PRO, BW 31/15, British Council summary of Grants 1939-40, March 29th 1940 
79 PRO, BW 31/15, Letter to Sellon, February 3rd 1940 
 42 
relations and had reached a position in which it was possible to assert their personal 
beliefs upon others within wider social and political structures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 43 
Cultural Efforts in Germany 
 
 
The focus of the British Council upon education as a means of cultural 
propaganda can be seen as a key feature within the overall policy of British 
propaganda during the 1930s; that of projecting a positive image of Britain and the 
promotion of mutual understanding between Britain and other nations. However, there 
were also alternative methods of improving cultural relations with European countries 
with the intention of having a more immediate effect upon relations than the long-
term strategy of investing British values via educational facilities. For example, an 
attempt to form greater bonds between Britain and German academics can be found 
regarding Heidelberg University. The head of the English Department at the 
University contacted the British Council stating that although Britain had the 
available institutes to develop a greater cultural understanding of foreign countries, 
the view of Britain in this manner was completely unsupported in Germany
80
. A 
lecture programme was designed to combat this; however there were substantial fears 
amongst both the British Council and Foreign Office that a reciprocal course of 
German lectures would need to be held in Britain. This would mean letting German 
propaganda, widely recognised as being a state affair, penetrate Britain where it could 
develop freely as there was „no such censorship to exercise a curbing effect‟ as there 
would be facing British educational and cultural work within Germany
81
. Despite the 
difficulties in promoting Britain in Germany, lectures held at German Universities, 
distribution of pro-British literature and the creation of essay writing competitions on 
the subject of Britain, British influence in the educational sphere can be seen as 
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negligible, and as such a near total failure in comparison to similar efforts in France, 
Italy and the Middle East. 
 
One such alternative strategy was to utilise private networks and independent 
groups to maintain friendly relations with foreign individuals holding influential 
positions. In Germany for instance, the long term strategy of influencing younger 
generations would have been completely ineffective, as the Nazi party had a firm 
grasp upon educational institutes, and exerted the utmost control over all aspects of 
education ranging from control of the syllabus to the appointment of appropriate 
teaching staff.  Considering this, the prospect of improving relations and mutual 
understanding between Britain and Germany stood a greater chance of success by 
simply attempting to improve and maintain relationships between influential figures 
of both nations. One such organisation dedicated to this task was the Anglo-German 
Fellowship, founded in 1935 by the wealthy British merchant banker Ernest Tennant. 
The Fellowship was a non-political organisation, declaring no official link with 
British policies, and declared its aim as „promoting better understanding between 
England and Germany in the hope of maintaining peace and prosperity in 
Europe‟82.The Fellowship was based upon an existing organisation in Germany, the 
Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft, whose members included many high ranking Nazi 
Party Members such as General Ritter von Epp, Staatssekretӓr Walther Funk, and 
Joachim von Ribbentrop as well as numerous Germany ministers and industrialists. 
British members of the fellowship included Lord Mount Temple as Chairman and Sir 
Raymond Beasley of the Foreign Office, and held an estimated total membership of 
600 individuals and business ventures by October 1937, many of which were leading 
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British manufacturers including British Steel Ltd and Dunlop Rubber Company 
Ltd
83
.Despite the claims of the AGF to be a non-political organisation with a number 
of high ranking figures involved, both British and German, the AGF proved to be 
ultimately unsuccessful in its aims. This was partly due to British concerns over 
German domestic and foreign politics, particularly the anti-Jewish activities that 
culminated in the increased pogroms of 1938 culminating in Krystallnacht of 
November 9th and 10th. As a result of these events Lord Mount Temple resigned 
from his post as Chairman, stating in the times - „I think it most desirable that there 
should be good feeling between the two nations, but I think all activities should wait 
[for a better time]‟84. By February of 1939 the AGF had run its course, with Herr 
Schallies stating that it had been „a great disappointment to the Nazis as it was hoped 
that it could exert great influence during periods of crisis‟, however as it had failed to 
do that in September 1938, an indirect reference to the Czech crisis and subsequent 
Munich Agreement, it would receive no more official assistance or funding within 
Germany and was shunned by Hitler. 
On a more traditionally cultural level, the London Philharmonic Orchestra 
conducted by Sir Thomas Beecham performed a tour of Germany, performing in 
Munich in December 1936. The report of this small tour states that „no effort was 
spared by the Party or the government in Bavaria to ensure the success of the visit – 
from a political rather than from a musical point of view‟. Beecham and his orchestra 
not only performed on the evening of the 17
th
, but were also invited to attend a dinner 
held by the Lord of Munich on the 16
th
 and a luncheon held by the Prime Minister of 
Bavaria in the afternoon of the 17
th
. The concert itself seems to have been negatively 
affected by the overtly political way in which the German authorities treated the visit, 
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with the report describing the atmosphere as „colder than usual at a Munich 
concert…due to the fact that genuine music lovers were rather displaced by the 
official guests who were there to further Anglo-German relations rather than listen to 
the music‟85. Beecham himself noted this ulterior motive, and in annex of the report it 
is stated he felt „disgusted by the tour‟ and wished himself and the orchestra to be 
regarded from a musical point of view rather than that in which it seemed they 
„appeared that they were no more than objects of political propaganda and living 
instances of “Anglo-German Relations”‟86. This again suggests a failure to succeed in 
dissemination cultural propaganda within Germany, as despite the visit being 
organised by the British Council it was managed and orchestrated entirely by German 
authorities in such a manner as to serve a beneficial political purpose for their own 
political ends. 
 
Thus, British efforts in penetrating Germany with cultural propaganda can be 
viewed overall as an unsuccessful enterprise when considering both the ineffective 
nature of British attempts to utilise education as a means of cultural influence, and the 
manipulation of British efforts by Germany to serve the needs of the state, as was the 
case with the Philharmonic tour of Munich in 1936. However, a memorandum 
assessing advantages and disadvantages of using propaganda to „weaken the fighting 
power of the German people‟ in the event of war highlighted the importance of 
producing „truthful‟ propaganda in order to achieve success87. The adoption of this 
strategy following the Munich Crisis appeared to show signs of having a positive 
effect in the German population. H D Tasker, a British businessman with factories 
                                                 
85 PRO, BW 63/1, Report on the London Philharmonic Orchestra in Munich, December 18th 1936 
86 PRO, BW 63/1, Report on the London Philharmonic Orchestra in Munich, Annex, December 18th 
1936 
87 PRO, CAB 104/89, Memorandum on the Dissemination of Ideas Among the German People to 
Weaken Their Fighting Power in War, September 19th, 1938 
 47 
located in Berlin, contacted the British Council stating that his employees had „little 
faith‟ in the German press, and that British news was desired by many despite the 
anti-British stance forwarded in the state-ran press
88
. Although this cannot be 
interpreted as a means of cultural propaganda, the utilisation of the reputation of 
Britain in honesty regarding news can be seen to represent a small success in the 
overall strategy of propaganda in Germany. A cultural approach to Germany arguably 
failed; however the use of „honest‟ news shows not only that the German public were 
susceptible to British propaganda, but that British propaganda policy was flexible 
when needed and could succeed in achieving penetration, albeit limited, in even the 
most totalitarian of states. 
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Fine Art, Film and the New York World Fair of 1939 
 
  
 
As discussed in the previous two chapters, a large portion of British efforts in 
the field of cultural propaganda involved utilising educational institutes to improve 
cultural understanding of Britain abroad. The long term strategy was to create an 
educated generation who would appreciate British culture and values, which would 
then in pass this knowledge as positive view of Britain on to future generations via 
teaching in the education systems of various countries. However, there were more 
specific areas of focus placed upon projecting Britain abroad in a positive light by 
celebrating achievements in culture and other aspects such as manufacturing and 
engineering. The use of film can be seen as one such example of promoting British 
achievements, while the promotion of British art was utilised to specifically represent 
British cultural achievements on a global scale. 
The possibilities of using film as a means of gaining publicity and promoting 
Britain abroad were used throughout the 1920s, with discussions to form a Foreign 
Office Film Unit taking place in 1920 with the intention of producing propaganda 
films. Although the proposal did not become a reality, the DOT and the Foreign 
Office recognised the importance of utilising film to promote British trade abroad, 
despite having to rely on individual films produced by private companies to promote 
British achievements in manufacturing and trade abroad
89
. In the 1930s prior to the 
formation of the British Council in 1934 the task of projecting Britain abroad fell to 
the Travel Association and the DOT. By 1932, the Travel Association had created its 
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own film unit, producing a number of films for non-theatrical distribution to foreign 
schools and societies as well as producing short documentary films concerning 
various areas of Britain. In April 1936 the Joint Film Committee of the British 
Council and the Travel Association was formed, chaired by Phillip Guedalla with 
other members including the general manager of the British Film Institute Oliver Bell, 
E L Mercier representing the DOT, Colonel Charles Bridge representing the British 
Council, and John Grierson in joint capacity as Post Office Film Officer and Film 
Advisor to the Travel Association
90
. 
At the fifth meeting of the Joint Committee, a report on film distribution was 
discussed noting both funding from the British Council of £300 for the 
Mediterranean, £500 for South America, and for Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, 
Holland and the Baltic States £400 to aid the task. Also the various successes and 
difficulties faced in certain regions concerning the distribution of British films were 
extensively listed. The report stated difficulties concerning distribution of films with 
Palestine, however cited success in other ongoing negotiations to obtain theatrical 
release of British films in Egypt and in South America. With regard to the distribution 
of film in Europe, the meeting noted particularly the success met in Hungary where 
the Ministry of Education took films for display in schools, and the positive reception 
of the coronation film sent to the British Mission at Warsaw. The Committee agreed 
to use the newly available funds not only to aid distribution in the afore mentioned 
areas, but to make films available to special requests world wide, citing the positive 
reception of the coronation film in Tokyo as precedent for this strategy
91
. 
However, the internal relationship between the DOT, Travel Association and 
British Council was often turbulent, with each department favouring the production 
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and release of films that reflected their own interests making it difficult for the 
Committee to agree on suitable content of films. A report produced by Croom-
Johnson to the Secretary of the British Council highlights these difficulties as they 
arose at a showing of films at the GPO Film Unit in November 1937. Croom-Johnson 
states that most members of the Committee seemed „engineering minded‟, and likes to 
see „an impressive piece of machinery at the end of a film and did not seem to take 
account of other forms of British culture‟. Croom-Johnson concluded by highlighting 
two major criticisms of the Committee. Firstly, the attitude of the DOT carried too 
much weight, citing their insistence to include the sentence „all machines shown in 
this film were manufactured in Great Britain‟ at the end of the film British Steel; 
raising the possibility the Committee would simply appear a smoke screen for British 
trade penetration. Secondly, he gloomily concluded that the Committee was „apt to 
underestimate the mentality of foreign film audiences‟, and that in „playing down‟ to 
lower class film audiences the sympathy and interest of the intelligent anglophile 
students and newspaper readers that should also form the target audience would be 
lost, as well as failing to gain the interest of the unintelligent and unimportant 
viewer
92
. 
Despite these internal disputes the Committee distributed films to 23 countries 
in Europe, the Middle East, Far East and South America at a cost of £1178 between 
April 1
st
 and November 30
th
 1937
93
, and received further funding from the British 
Council of £1200 for the year 1937/38. The continued investment in the Committee 
suggests that the importance of film was recognised as been a highly important 
method of nation projection, while the high number of films distributed between April 
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and November 1930 leads one to the conclusion that the Joint Committee was 
succeeding in utilising film as a means of cultural propaganda far better than it had 
been under the control of the Travel Association between 1932 and the formation of 
the Committee in April 1936. 
The work of the Joint Committee in distributing films abroad continued along 
the same successful lines well into 1938, with a detailed report of film distribution 
produced in May 1938 highlighting the global reach of film as a means of publicising 
Britain abroad. In Europe alone the cinematic release of British films provided by the 
Travel Association was achieved in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. Films distributed under the auspice of the Joint 
Committee achieved cinematic release in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia and 
Yugoslavia, while both the Joint Committee and the Travel Association provided film 
for non-theatrical shows in the above mentioned countries as well as in Poland, 
Germany, Holland, and Italy. In the Mediterranean and Middle East cinematic release 
of British films was achieved in Albania, Cyprus, Egypt, Iraq, Malta, Palestine, the 
Sudan and Syria, and Turkey while non theatrical showings also took place in 
Morocco and Gibraltar. Regarding South America, Mexico and Cuba, the report states 
that four films adapted for theatrical distribution with Portuguese and Spanish 
subtitles were significantly more popular than those with English commentaries and 
localised subtitles. With this in mind it was decided that these films would be 
distributed direct from London to Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Columbia, Mexico 
and Cuba. The final section of the report focused upon the distribution and release of 
films in the Far East and foreign Possessions. Japan, Siam, and the Dutch East Indies 
saw the cinematic release of British films, while the Institute for Research in English 
Teaching at Tokyo also received films, while the Chinese University at Shantung 
 52 
received a copy of So This is Lancashire which was aired to an audience of 250 
students of the University
94
. 
The scale of the Joint Committee on Films‟ production and distribution 
between its formation in 1936 and mid-1938 can be judged as success in terms of 
projecting British life, culture, and achievements to a global audience both in cinemas 
across the world and also in private settings, such as clubs and associations such as 
the Anglo-Danish Society and the English Club based at Gablonz in Czechoslovakia, 
and educational facilities of all ranges. However, the success can only be viewed as 
limited due to the inability of British films to penetrate into the markets within the 
dictator countries; Germany, Italy and to a lesser degree Franco‟s Spain. The 
possibilities of airing British films in Italy was hindered by the hostile nature of 
Anglo-Italian relations following the Abyssinian Crisis, while negotiations in Spain 
only entailed the possibility of viewing in Nationalist held areas. However, the only 
stumbling block concerning the display of these films in Germany was a dispute over 
patent rights, however this was rectified in part by the release of a film made by 
Doring Film-Werke of Berlin with the cooperation of the TIDA film Unit in 1935, 
which was edited into a series of smaller films that remained broadcast throughout 
1937 and early 1938
95
. 
1939 presented an ideal opportunity to utilise film for the purposes of cultural 
propaganda on an international level in the form of the New York Worlds Fair. The 
theme of the fair was „Building the World of Tomorrow‟, and allowed for Britain to 
launch a policy of projecting Britain in the United States for the first time
96
. The 
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decision of the British government to participate in the fair was made in May 1937, 
with the entry designed to 
Foster friendship and goodwill between the United Kingdom and the USA by 
showing as much as we can of these Islands and the Empire; our adaptability 
to a changing world and the non-rigid character of our Empire-Commonwealth 
partnership; in short, to present the greatness of our life and country with 
dignity and charm, and thus to enable to millions of Americans who will visit 
the fair to know and appreciate us and in due course to visit us‟97. 
 
The Joint Films Committee cooperated with the DOT to produce film material for the 
World Fair, with the Post Office also producing several documentary films including 
Spare Parts and British Made, as well as the five British run newsreel companies 
producing a series of special editions ran on a five week rotation in alphabetical order. 
The newsreels were a popular exhibition during the first season of the World Fair, and 
increased further in popularity when the second season opened in 1940 due to the fact 
that the British newsreels were often more up to date concerning events unfolding in 
Europe than those produced in America
98
. British Made focused specifically on the 
work of the skilled craftsman within Britain, taking the viewer on a historical journey 
from the Chippendale woodcraft of the mid-eighteenth century, through the 
development of an industrial boom to the great depression following the Wall Street 
crash of 1929, finally arriving at the present with the imminent threat of war
99
. The 
emphasis throughout the film was the importance of traditional craft being practiced 
along side the growth of modern industry, and the strength of which both old and new 
techniques would give the rising British generation
100
. The total investment regarding 
British Made had reached £944 upon completion in August 1939, significantly greater 
than the estimates of June which amounted to £192 in addition to the £500 already 
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invested in filming and editing to this point. The film Spare Parts also received a 
great deal of investment, with the total for filming and production arriving at £866
101
. 
This combined expenditure of £1810 serves to show just how significant an 
opportunity the World Fair was in the British policy of national projection on a global 
scale. The investment placed upon the entries for British film at the Fair proved a 
worthwhile one, with Taylor describing the official British entry as a „triumph for the 
projection of England‟, stating that within two weeks of the formal opening, almost 
eight million people had visited the site with over half of those entering the British 
pavilion. A film of the coronation was one of the most popular British exhibits, and 
following a royal visit in June 1939 popularity increased to an even greater level with 
an estimated two thousand people passing through the cinema within the British 
pavilion per day
102
. 
 Film was not the only means of cultural propaganda utilised by Britain at the 
New York World Fair. Both fine art and orchestral music performances were also 
presented alongside films and historical exhibitions such as the Magna Carta in an 
attempt to showcase British cultural history and achievement. This was not the first 
instance of Britain exhibiting art at an international exhibition as a method of 
showcasing cultural achievements. Prior to the creation of the Board of Trade 
Exhibitions branch in 1912, British involvement in overseas exhibitions was the 
responsibility of various Royal Commissions appointed specifically to handle an 
individual exhibition. The DOT assumed control of British representation at foreign 
exhibitions in 1918; however participation was limited due to the lack of regular sums 
to fund such activities in national projection. Despite this, participation at the 1922 
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Brazilian Centenary Exhibition and the Paris Decorative Arts Exhibition of 1925 were 
deemed as highly successful ventures
103
. 
The precedent for art exhibitions in the era of the British Council was set in 
1937 at the Exposition Internationale de Paris 1937 – Arts et techniqués dans la vie 
Moderne, which ran between April and October. The DOT, in cooperation with the 
Council of Art and Industry and the Board of Trade, erected and filled a pavilion with 
objects of Industrial Art connected with British life such as art in dress such as sport 
and games, art connected with travel, and art depicting individual rooms within a 
house
104
. The Fine Arts Committee of the British Council was represented by six 
artists hastily assembled following a plea to Lady Chamberlain from monsieur 
Dézzarrois, who had contacted the Bureau of British Women Workers but had 
received no reply, meaning as such Britain would have been the only country invited 
to not be represented in the field of Fine Arts. As the works of only six artists were 
required, Lady Chamberlain contacted Longden who made the necessary 
arrangements instantly via telephone and secured the work of Ethel Walker, Vanessa 
Bell, Beatrice Bland, Dame Laura Knight, Anna Zinkeisen and Mrs Campbell 
Dodgson for loan and display at the exhibition
105
. 
Fortunately, there was no repeat of the Paris debacle concerning preparations 
to include an array of Fine Arts for exhibition at the New York World Fair. As early 
as February 1938 preparations began to include Fine Arts at New York, in particular 
the contingency that should the British pavilion prove too small to locate an Art 
exhibition, Britain should be represented at either New York or the golden Gate 
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Exposition in San Francisco
106
. The pavilion did indeed house a moderate gallery, 
including a collection of classic and modern plate, while also providing British works 
in sculpture such as Recumbent Figure by Henry Moore and Pax by Frank Dobson, as 
well as an exhibit of modern British architecture donated by the Royal Institute of 
British Architects. A letter from Louis Beale to Major Wickham noted that the British 
pavilion opened with every exhibit completed with an „enormous crowd‟ estimated at 
nearly 200,000 stating everyone appeared to be „extremely pleased with what we have 
shown‟ on the opening day107. Of the artistic exhibits present in the British pavilion, 
one of the largest was the Exhibition of Contemporary British Art which consisted of 
thirteen pieces by seven artists including watercolours by Vivian Pitchforth, John 
Nash, Augustus John, Edward Burra and Edward Ardizzone. John‟s work in chalk 
drawing and pen-and-wash drawing were also present, as well as sketches by Sir 
Muirhead Bone and Henry Moore
108
. Despite the number of artists represented at the 
exhibit within the pavilion, the FACBC was inundated with applications from British 
artists who desired their work to be exhibited at the World Fair. Throughout February 
and March of 1939 the FACBC replied to letters from artists and owners volunteering 
works for exhibit. Amongst those rejected for exhibition at the World Fair were the 
piece Highland Cattle by J D Adams as it was not eligible for display as only 
contemporary British art was being represented, with as a series of 85 miniatures of 
Royals created in 1911 by Charles Turrell on the same grounds. Pieces by the artists 
Frances Drummond and Vera Temple were also turned down due to the fact that the 
exhibition was already complete, as well as the sculpture Serenitas in Rebus by A 
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Bertram Pegram
109
. The representation of Fine Art at the British pavilion at the World 
Fair indicates that the projection of contemporary British cultural achievements was 
recognised as a future avenue for the direction of cultural propaganda, and one which 
could be used along side historical British achievements to represent the continuation 
of British values. The interest within Britain sparked by the inclusion of an artistic 
exhibit within the British pavilion suggests that the World Fair offered not only an 
opportunity to project Britain abroad, but also allowed the possibility that the positive 
impact of the World Fair within Britain would encourage and inspire a future 
generation to become involved in art, and continue to produce work representative of 
Britain‟s strong cultural heritage. 
 
Finally, British cultural achievements in the field of music were highlighted at 
the New York World Fair in a series of concerts featuring the Philharmonic 
Symphony Orchestra. The two concerts performed by the orchestra were arranged by 
the British Council to take place during „British Week‟ of the World Fair with Sir 
Adrian Boult, Musical Director of the BBC, conducting. The premiere at Carnegie 
Hall featured Arnold Bax‟s Seventh Symphony, a piece commissioned by the British 
Council especially for the event of the concerts at the World Fair. Despite the obvious 
aim of showcasing British musical achievements, the only other all-British work of 
the evening was an oboe concerto composed by Eugene Goossen, which performed as 
a duet for oboe and piano, played by his Brother Leon as somewhat of a novelty for 
the audience
110
. 
The British concerts in New York received a great deal of coverage in the 
press, with Musical America stating that the concerts at the Carnegie hall brought a 
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„thrilling climax‟ to the musical festival in connection with the World Fair. The article 
also states that the function of the British Council was to „make the life and thought of 
the British peoples more widely known abroad, and to promote an interchange of 
knowledge and ideas with other peoples‟, and proclaims that the newly composed 
symphony by Sir Arnold Bax is an admirable means to that end. The final two pieces 
commissioned for the worlds fair by Bliss and Williams premiered at the second 
concert, and were equally as well received at the work of Bax, with the article 
declaring that the concerto composed by Bliss was „one of the most important works 
composed since the turn of the century‟, stating the concert was played with „life and 
fire and lusciousness of tone‟ under Boult that all elements converged to create a 
performance of absorbing interest
111
. The New York World-Telegram also highly 
praised the music performed bearing the headline „Last British Concert Acclaimed‟. 
The article particularly praised the inclusion of music from nations other than Britain, 
and reported that upon the final performance of final concert on June 10
th
 the large 
audience „rendered the composer and soloist with a thunderous ovation‟112. The New 
York Times also noted the inclusion of American music, while the New York Sun also 
noted the enthusiasm of applause given by the audience and its large size
113
, as did the 
New York Journal stating Carnegie Hall had filled to capacity for the show
114
. Despite 
the attitude of the press suggesting the concerts were a total success, the Brooklyn 
Eagle noted that the „sultry atmosphere inside the hall did not make for the best 
instrumental efficiency, while the audience sweltered‟, and criticised the performance 
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of Debussy‟s Afternoon of a Faun for lacking quality, despite judging the concert as a 
whole to be „good‟115. 
 
In terms of bringing British cultural achievements to an international audience, 
the World Fair of 1939 can be deemed as a successful venture on behalf of the British 
Council and its affiliated organisations. The British entry also showed that 
cooperation between rival organisations vying to represent Britain abroad could be 
achieved, with the Travel Association, DOT and British Council working successfully 
together to produce a variety of films representing British life as well as documentary 
films showcasing British industrial methods and achievements. Taylor also concludes 
that in terms of sheer numbers of people reached the British contribution to the World 
Fair was a triumph, but also notes that it was an „uncharacteristic performance‟ as 
British propaganda was not as coordinated or politically important as it was in the 
totalitarian nations
116
. However the British entry was well organised and coordinated 
with all exhibits present serving to present Britain in a similar manner, somewhat of a 
rarity in the 1930s considering the variety of associations involved with the projection 
of Britain and the lack of an overarching department coordinating all efforts in 
propaganda towards the same ends. The World Fair can also be seen to have stirred 
interest within Britain. This indicates that British cultural propaganda not only served 
to projection Britain in a positive light abroad, but also had succeeded in securing „as 
firm a hold as possible on the minds and interests of the population‟117, an important 
political role of cultural propaganda both home and abroad. Finally, although the 
amount of pro-British sentiment created by British involvement in the World Fair is 
impossible to measure, the effect may have been a strong consideration in the 
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development of American sympathies towards Britain at a time when the spectre of a 
European conflict loomed large. As such, this pro-British sentiment cannot be ruled 
out as a major factor in the decision of America to participate in the European conflict 
rather than simply focusing war efforts on the threat of Japan. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
The methods of cultural propaganda discussed in this paper are not 
representative of the entire British policy regarding propaganda. However cultural 
propaganda was without doubt a key component of the overall system producing 
propaganda, and intrinsically linked commercial propaganda with that of fostering a 
positive national image when faced with the prospect of a European conflict involving 
the dictator nations. Cultural propaganda, and indeed all British propaganda, can also 
be considered a key aspect of British foreign policy during the period despite the 
limitations caused by the sceptical attitude of the government. Propaganda served to 
reinforce a hold on an empire which had been considered by some to be a paper tiger 
since the 1910s, an indeed this image was used to support aggressive German policies 
under Bismark before the end of the nineteenth century
118
. 
However, it can be difficult to judge the success of propaganda in altering 
perceptions and improving international relations. Official reports composed by 
Foreign Office and British Council officials stationed in areas where cultural 
propaganda was focused can provide a rough assessment of influence gained or lost 
due to certain activities. Equally, correspondence from foreign nationals and civilians 
living in countries can provide an idea of how Britain was perceived abroad by 
drawing upon their own personal encounters. Effectively judging the extent of 
influence created by certain types of propaganda has been an issue encountered by 
previous scholars within the field. In her study of the BBC and home front 
propaganda, Nichols concludes that were it not for the BBC‟s wartime broadcasts „the 
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civilian populations understanding of what it should do and what it might expect 
would have been seriously undermined‟. But beyond that it would be hard to state 
with any certainty how influential wartime propaganda actually was. Nichols also 
notes that it is also impossible to quantify the effects of the broadcasts on the morale 
of the population, and that even with the benefit of the Morale Charts produced by the 
MOI, it is only possible to conclude that morale rose and fell with the perception of 
military success or failure
119
. Similarly, regarding the New York World Fair in 1939, 
Taylor notes that while British propaganda utilised this event to reach out to millions 
of Americans to promote British values and culture, it is impossible to estimate just 
how much pro-British sentiment was created by this
120
, and in turn how great a factor 
propaganda was in gaining American support in the European conflict of World War 
Two. Finally, the success of cultural propaganda can also be hard to judge in relation 
to wider international events and political relations. For example, the imposition of 
sanctions upon Italy by the LON following the Abyssinian Crisis had a negative 
impact upon the work of the British Institute at Florence as discussed in chapter two. 
However, does the resulting decrease in popularity reflect a failure on behalf of 
British efforts in Italy, or can it be argued that a reduction in students for the academic 
year 1936-1937 was merely a reaction to the removal of English as a subject taught in 
Italian schools? The latter would suggest that a decline in students was a pragmatic 
response to the immediate situation; mainly that students would study German or 
French as this subject provided a greater chance of gaining employment as a teacher 
when the future of English subjects in Italian schools appeared hopeless. As such, it 
would be unwise to state that British efforts in the field of cultural propaganda in Italy 
                                                 
119 S Nichols, The Echo of War: Home Front Propaganda and the Wartime BBC, 1939-1945, p.271 
120 P M Taylor, The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939, 
p.119 
 63 
were unsuccessful without considering the wider context of Anglo-Italian relations in 
the immediate post-Abyssinian period. 
 
Bearing in mind the difficulties in assessing the success of propaganda, in 
particular the methods of cultural propaganda discussed above, the question of how 
effective British efforts were and what, if any, methods proved more fruitful than 
others, is a complicated one. With regard to cultural efforts in the Near and Middle 
East, the main subject of this paper focuses upon the role of education as a medium of 
propaganda. There are two main criteria available to the historian attempting to gauge 
the success of this approach to improving cultural relations. The first would be to 
consider the number of students attending British-run institutes in the region at this 
time and the increase in numbers throughout the period. The second approach to 
judging the success of propaganda in the region would be to consider the range of 
British influence in terms of numbers of schools in various countries, utilising figures 
relating to the distribution of education aids such as films, and the allocation funding 
to institutes across the region. With regard to the first point, the number of students 
who received a British education in Egypt suggests that the expansion of institutes‟ in 
the region after 1936 led to a drastic rise in local students with the total number of 
students increasing by 10% between 1936 and 1937. The number of native teachers 
who had received a British education also rose during the same period, suggesting that 
the long term strategy of educating future generations via those with pro-British 
values had began to prove fruitful within the decade. 
While this suggests that the use of education as a means of cultural 
propaganda was successful in Egypt, the same cannot be said for the entirety of the 
Middle East. On April 1
st
 1941 a nationalist coup took place in Iraq. Known as the 
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Golden Square coup, the uprising against the pro-British government of Abd al-llah 
and Prime Minister Nuri as-Said was led by pro-German members of the army and 
cabinet. The revolt was supported and partly funded by the Nazi regime
121
, and 
replaced Nuri as Prime Minister with Rashid Ali with the intention of gaining full 
Iraqi independence. The Golden Square Coup can be seen to highlight both the 
success and failings of British propaganda in the area. On the one hand, Britain had 
ensured good relations with Iraq throughout the interwar years, and had an ally in the 
Middle East in the pro-British government of Suri. Conversely, the opportunity for 
revolution was seized during the war, and suggests that propaganda had been 
unsuccessful in creating an overall pro-British opinion. This can be seen in particular 
with regard to the military hierarchy of Iraq, with many high-ranking figures 
participating in the uprising, which was eventually quelled by British forces leading to 
occupation which continued until 1947. 
 
Similarly, the use of education as a means of cultural propaganda in central 
Europe can be classified as a generally successful undertaking. Rather than attempting 
to set up British-run schools, education policy in Europe focused on the use of the 
British Institutes to increase the understanding of British literature and the cultural 
values that it represtented. The study above focuses upon the Institutes located at 
Florence and Paris, and both can be seen to have been successful in terms of having 
educated a generation of scholars and educators with sympathetic views to Britain. 
The Institute at Florence regularly received over 200 full time students per year, while 
the number of full time French students of English at the Paris centre increased from 
164 in 1929-30 to 613 for the year 1937-38. The methods used to increase an 
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understanding not only included English education for students, but also a variety of 
guest lecturers on a variety of subjects based on British society and history as well as 
the organisation of numerous summer schools and visits to Britain for both Italian and 
French students. 
While the Institutes can be seen to have reached many students within France 
and Italy, the extent to which we can attribute any signs of success of this type of 
propaganda can again be questioned in relation to international events. The negative 
reaction within Italy to the Abyssinian crisis and the resultant imposition of economic 
sanctions highlights the futility of British efforts when in direct contest against the 
will of Mussolini and the Fascist party. Despite the popularity of the Institute amongst 
students, English was removed from the curriculum due to Britain‟s involvement with 
the League of Nations, and as such the number of students fell enormously in the 
following academic year. The institute was to recover its prestige following the 
completion of the Gentlemen‟s Agreement in 1938, however the fortune of the 
Institute and its relation to wider international politics cannot be ignored. In short, in 
can be argued that the Institute at Florence flourished when Anglo-Italian relations 
were amicable, while also suffering when relations were hostile with Britain and Italy 
in direct disagreement over major issues such as acceptable behaviours in pursing an 
expansionist foreign policy. During wartime, the cultural propaganda conducted in 
Italy pre-1939 can be seen to have had greater success than that in the Middle East, 
particularly that in Iraq. Italian conduct during the Second World War would suggest 
that the majority of Italians did not „dislike‟ Britain, a point supported by the 
relatively gentlemanly conduct of Italian actions in North Africa. Although it is 
impossible to state that this was a direct product of British propaganda activities, it 
does suggest that cultural propaganda may well have been successful in instilling to 
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some degree a pro-British mindset within the Italian public, one which transcended 
international events. This is highlighted in the case of the Italian resistance movement 
immediately following Italian surrender to allied forces, as well as the example of the 
instant response of the co-belligerent army and air force in combat against German 
forces. 
 
With regard to the use of film to reach a global audience, and art as a means of 
showcasing the cultural achievements of Britain, British work in this area can be seen 
as a relatively successful undertaking. The development of film as a means of cultural 
propaganda accelerated drastically throughout the late 1930s, and can be considered a 
successful venture in projecting a positive image of Britain across the world. 
Distribution of British film in every continent expanded greatly upon the work of the 
Travel Association undertaken in the 1920s and early 1930s designed to increased 
tourism by increasing levels of commercial propaganda, and those produced by the 
DOT intended to boost British manufacturing in foreign countries. The culmination of 
the work of the British Council, Travel Association and DOT regarding film can be 
seen as the World Fair of 1939. The significance of British participation in the event 
was twofold; firstly it offered the British Council the opportunity to operate in 
America, and secondly it also enabled Britain to showcase cultural achievements and 
aims for the future to a mass audience consisting of not only the American public, but 
also representatives from all countries present at the Fair. 
Foreign Exhibits of British arts were handled by specially appointed Royal 
Commissions prior to 1918, and then subsequently by the DOT between 1918 and 
1936, where upon its creation the British council assumed a leading role in 
participation in foreign exhibitions. The 1937 Exposition Internationale de Paris was 
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the first attempt by the British Council to arrange participation in an international 
exhibition, and was rushed in preparation with works chosen hastily at very short 
notice. However, the participation of Britain at the New York World Fair can be seen 
as a significant improvement in the preparation and planning for the event, as well as 
showcasing a wider variety of British cultural works. 
British cultural propaganda under the direction of the British Council can be 
considered a success in several areas. Regarding educational strategies as a method of 
improving foreign opinions of Britain, the work in Italy, France and Egypt can be 
seen as successful due to the number of students participating in British run courses. 
This adapted into a long term key strategy of ensuring teachers and scholars with pro-
British sentiments emerged that would, in turn, educate future generations with these 
values. Thus, the importance of foreign youth to the future of British prestige abroad 
was recognised, and tackled on a large scale met with an overall success, as was the 
increase in production and distribution of British films designed to educate on the 
subject of Britain and improve understanding of its history and culture. 
However to consider the cultural propaganda methods utilised by Britain in 
the period to be an overwhelming success would be ignoring several key areas in 
which British efforts can be seen to have made little or no impact. The most obvious 
example of the failure of British cultural propaganda to influence a foreign society 
can be seen in Germany. This was not due to lack of effort on the part of Britain, but 
rather due to the totalitarian nature of the Nazi state which held full control over 
educational and cultural institutes as well as having a single, dedicated propaganda 
ministry. In comparison to the well-oiled machinery of the Nazi state, attempts to 
disseminate propaganda within Germany were met with failure, despite ventures such 
as the AGF. The only success evident within Germany in terms of propaganda during 
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this period was the popularity of British news, as many within Germany were acutely 
aware of the propagandist nature of the German press and as such the manipulation of 
news which continued to be so into the Second World War. The BBC was popular 
amongst many nationalities both within the Axis and occupied countries of Europe. 
This trust in the BBC can be interpreted as a result of peoples desire to find an escape 
from occupying influences, however it can also be seen as a subtle reflection of 
British cultural propaganda efforts throughout the 1930s. The trust in British news can 
clearly be seen to reflect positively upon British desires to provide truthful, fact-based 
propaganda, and thus highlights the success in propaganda policy developed 
throughout the interwar years. It could also be concluded that the success of the BBC 
was not due to creating a positive image of Britain within Germany, but rather in 
influencing opinion and highlighting the undesirable aspects of Nazi rule, such as the 
obvious censure of the news and press. This can be seen as the foundations of radio as 
a means of wartime propaganda with the intentions of both offering a boost for morale 
and gaining civilian support in occupied Europe, but also to undermine the authority 
and influence of the Axis. 
 
Overall it is difficult to gauge the success of British cultural propaganda 
during this period. There can be strong arguments made to highlight both successes 
and failures in various areas, and also that certain approaches to improving cultural 
relations were better received than others. However, the work of the British Council 
in the field of cultural propaganda can clearly be defined as groundbreaking and 
ahead of its time, while the continuation of the organisations activity to the present 
day would further suggest the importance of cultural relations in the modern era. 
Despite the closure of many of its European and Middle Eastern offices during the 
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Second World War, the Council continued its work based from within Britain offering 
educational services to refugees and servicemen alike. Following the Second World 
War, the Council continued its work on a much smaller scale, partly due to a decline 
in funding by the Foreign Office as well as a series of reports which concluded post-
war intelligence needs would be organised and conducted solely by the Secret 
Intelligence Service
122
. Despite losing its prominent role at the head of cultural 
relations, and the resultant funding cuts, the British council has continued to serve as 
an independent organisation focusing upon international teaching and „cultural 
opportunities‟. In comparison to existing works focusing upon British inter-war 
propaganda as a whole, this paper can be seen as providing a focus upon the less 
explored means of „cultural‟ propaganda by highlighting the comparatively subtle and 
everyday forms of influence such as education, film, and art as opposed to the more 
overt and popular perception of propaganda such as posters and other highly patriotic 
forms. In doing so, this paper can be seen to aid the study of British inter-war 
propaganda by providing a concise and in depth study into the role of one of the key 
players of inter-war propaganda in the British Council, and the various mediums 
utilised which, under many circumstances, would not be termed propaganda in the 
modern sense. 
 
As of 2007 the Council operated 70 centres in 53 countries, offering 
examinations in English to over one million candidates per annum, with the Middle 
Eastern region participating in 53 collaborative projects with British schools
123
. With 
offices in Afghanistan, Israel and Iraq, the British Council can be seen to remain a 
fixture in British cultural relations in troubled areas. During a period in which Britain 
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is again perceived negatively in many regions, the importance of the Council in 
building and maintaining cultural relations can be directly compared to that attributed 
to the organisation from its creation in 1934 to the outbreak of war in 1939. A 
comparison between the two periods could be made in terms of the number of 
institutes ran by the British Council, as well as the number of foreign nationals 
attending British Council courses. 
But despite these successes, a major diplomatic controversy surrounded 
British Council operations in Russia during 2007, leading to closure in 2008 amidst 
accusations of illegal operation and tax evasion. Russian foreign minister Sergei 
Lavrov defended the closure of two offices outside Moscow, stating it was not an 
anti-British action but one completely justified by Russian law while also admitting it 
was retaliation for the expulsion of Russian diplomats from London in July allegedly 
involved in the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko
124
. British Council activities have 
also been further limited by the closure of branches in Europe designed to allow for a 
„huge increase in activities based in the Middle East and Muslim world‟. Cathy 
Stephens, the acting director of the Council during this period, stated „the new 
strategy will not only prove beneficial to Britain's long-term security and prosperity 
but perfectly upholds the council's mission of 'increasing appreciation of the UK's 
ideas and achievements overseas'. However criticism arose from many, including 
Charles Arnold-Baker, author of The Companion to British History, who feels that the 
concept is misguided and will simply alienate British friends in Europe
125
. 
 
It would be unwise to directly compare the current role of the institute to that 
of the 1930s, as its role can be seen to have changed from that of a vessel of cultural 
                                                 
124 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/dec/13/russia.lukeharding,  
125 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/aug/05/helenasmith.theobserver  
 71 
propaganda to one dedicated to learning and education. Despite the difference in core 
purpose of the Council, its continued existence and operation serves to highlight the 
relationship between culture, politics and economics on an international scale, as well 
as ensuring the value of cultural understanding is not neglected in modern society. 
While the future of Council activities in Europe may seem uncertain, expansion in the 
Middle East ensures that the activities of the British Council will continue for the 
foreseeable future. In an age where extremism and terrorism prove a real threat to 
British security, cultural propaganda can be seen as a realistic defence mechanism. In 
hoping to create a generation with pro-British sympathies via education and the 
promotion of cultural understanding, the British Council will again play a large role in 
British foreign policy similar to that of its heyday in the 1930s. 
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